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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS HOLl\fES, a minor by
Howard Holmes as guardian ad lite1n,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
J. ENOS NELSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As the defendant has stated, this is an appeal from
the order of the trial judge granting a new trial from
a jury verdict of "no cause of action".

It is believed that a restatement of the facts are
necessary to simplify the issues before this court. To
avoid confusion, the parties will be referred to as they
are identified below.
The accident occured sometime after 8:00 P.M. July
11, 1955, and although the defendant stated he was driv-
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ing with lights, it was not dark. The State highway patrolman who was called to the scene of the accident did
not use his lights until he got to the scene of the accident
(Tr. 37, 38).
The accident was caused when the defendant, who
was driving north on 800 West Street, Bountiful, Utah,
ran his vehicle into the plaintiff, a three and one-half
year old infant, with sufficient impact as to cause
permanent brain damage (Tr. 153). The point of impact was 4 feet 6 inches east of the mid-line of the street,
or well into the defendant't lane of traffic, which was
16 feet 8 inches wide Tr. 43, B on blackboard photograph.)
The following facts are undisputed by the defendant:
1. That defendant was warned by his wife that
there were children in or near the street when defendant
"·as 300 feet south of the point of ilnpact (Tr. 203, 204).
~. That the defendant saw children himself when
he was 200 feet south of the point of impact (Tr. 9).

3. That the defendant recognized and did anticipate that children would likely be present in the neighborhood and that the~· did unpredictable things (Tr. 5,
6, 7, 27).
r:rhat the defendant clain1s his vision was impaired h~· an oncmning vehicle (Tr. 8).
4-.

5. 'l1 hat notwithstanding defendant's knowledge
of the presence of the children in and about the street,
his knowledge that they were unpredictable, and his
teu1poraril~· obscured vision, he relied on the assumption
2
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that they would remain on the west side of the road
and did not increase his vigilance, sound his horn, swerve
to the side, or slow down ( Tr. 9, 10, 28, 29).
6. That defendant claims he was 75 feet south of
the point of impact when he first saw the plaintiff. That
plaintiff was then leaving the sidewalk which was 33
feet 9 inches west of the point of impact (Tr. 23, Blackboard photograph, 35, 105).
7.. That the defendant's own expert testified that
defendant could have stopped his car at the maximu1n
speed claimed by the defendant ten feet before the point
of impact (Tr. 191).
There was an abundance of evidence that the plaintiff was playing ball in his front yard prior to the
accident and that after the passing of the vehicle which
defendant claims blocked his vision (Tr. 53, 54), a girl
on a bicycle crossed the street from a point just north
of the impact and had reached her home some distance
to the south prior to the accident (Tr. 64, 65, 66). Subsequent to the girl's crossing the street, a small boy
preceded the plaintiff across the street after a ball and
was standing on the east side of the street when the
accident occurred (Tr. 5, 6).
Neither the defendant or his wife denied these
facts. They merely said they never saw the boy or the
girl on the bicycle at any time, and that they didn't see
plaintiff until he was 75 feet south of the point of impact.
The record also includes expert testimony that the
defendant should have been able to stop his vehicle
within 53 feet at 25 miles per hour, and within 43 feet
at 20 miles per hour, taking into consideration the type

3
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of pavement, coefficient of friction, weather, and other
factors present (Tr. 113, 114).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S FIRST POIN-T OX APPEAL
DOES NOT STATE A LEGAL REASON OR JUSTI:B-,ICATION FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID XOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ORDERING A NEW TRIAL.
ARGU~IEXT

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S FIRST POIXT OK APPEAL
DOES XOT STATE A LEGAL REASOX OR JUSTIFIC.ATIOX FOR THE REVERS~~L OF THE TRlA_L
COURT'S ORDER.
The defendant clai1ns that there was evidence upon
"·hich the jury could have reached the verdict of "no
eau~e". Even if it be conceded that such evidence was
available, whieh plaintiff does not. that fact would not
<·on~titute ground for reversal. The rule in Utah was
::-;tatP<l in Kiu,q r. Cuiuu Pacific R. Cu .. 117 Utah ±0. :21:2
P. (2d) ()~)~. In that ea::-;e. the cause was tried twice.
rrhe first tria] resulted, as here, in a jury yerdict for
t IH' dPf<>ndaHt. The court granted a new trial which
n·::-;nlted in a substantial verdict for the plaintiff. The
<h· 1'<-JHlan t n ppealed, claiming mnong other things that
t lwre was ample ~mbstantial evidence to warrant the
4
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verdict in the first trial and that the court's order for a
new trial was an usurption of the function of the jury.
The court answered both contentions as follows at page
696, 697:
"On the contrary, in Cheffey v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 252, 260, an action arising
under the F.E.L.A., a federal district court
granted a new trial in reliance upon Garrison v.
U.S., 4 Cir., 62 F. 2d 41, where it was said:
" 'Where there is substantial evidence in
support of plaintiff's case, the judge may not
direct a verdict against him, even though he n1ay
not believe his evidence or may think that the
weight of the evidence is on the other side; for,
under the constitutional guarantee of trial by
jury, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence and
pass upon its credibility. He may, however, set
aside a verdict supported by substantial evidence
where in his opinion it is contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence
which is false; for, even though the evidence be
sufficient to preclude the direction of a verdict,
it is still his duty to exercise his power over
the proceedings before him to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'
"The defendant urges that if a trial judge
is allowed to set aside a verdict returned by a
jury which is supported by substantial competent evidence, there results an infringement
upon its right to a trial by jury. There is no
merit in this contention."
In reviewing these problems, it must be remembered
that the plaintiff was 3 and one-half years of age. The
duty owed him was not that of ordinary care. As was
said by the Supreme Court of Utah in Woodward v.

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578, 63 P. (2d) 267,
at page 271:

"It is alleged in the complaint that the child
who was killed was on the shoulder of the highway and that the highway where the grievances
occurred was extensively used by pedestrians for
travel. Such allegations, coupled with the conclusive proof that Charles Franklin and his two
brothers were there just before the accident
and that such fact was known to the defendant
Brown, entitled plaintiff to an instruction as to
the law applicable to the state of facts. Having
alleged the facts upon which he relied for recovery, it is not necessary for plaintiff to allege
the degree of care that the defendants were required to exercise. It is a matter of common
knowledge that children are prone to be less
mindful of danger than are persons of mature
years. For that reason, a greater degree of care
is required of a person who drives an automobile
in close proximity to n1ature persons. Herald v.
Smith, supra; Green Y. Higbee, 66 Utah, 539,
~±-± P. 906; Blashfield's Cyc. of Automobile Law
and Practice (Perm. Ed.) Yol. 2, § 1492, p. 519."
The closest case in point that we have found is the
l~J33 ea~e of Sclwcidcr r. Sheldon, Pa., 110 A. (2d) 226.
The plaintiff \\·as a four-year old child that was seen
son1e 500 feet a way b~· the defendant standing on the
<'Urb of the street. Judgn1ent by nonsuit was entered
in fayor of the defendant. The Supren1e Court of Penn~ylvania reversed, stating at page :.:!~8:
''The fact that there is no evidence as to the
ratl' of speed at which the defendant was driving
his autonwbile does not operate to relieve hi1n of
6
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responsibility for the accident. If he was aware
of the child's presence on or near the highway
long enough to bring his automobile to a stop in
time to avoid striking the child and failed to do
so, as the evidence in the present state of the
record indicates was the case, then he would be
guilty of negligence regardless of the speed at
which he was driving: cf. Kuehne v. Brown, 257
Pa. 37, 41, 101 A. 77."
There is no doubt that :Mr. Nelson could have done
much to avoid the accident. He had notice frmn 300
feet away. He did nothing at that or any time to avert
this tragedy. It is submitted that the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial by reason of the fact that the verdict
was against the clear weight of the evidence and that
the verdict was not supported either in theory or fact.
On the contrary, the undisputed evidence from the
defendant and his own witness warrant the conclusion
that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law on
three points: A. The defendant breached the duty imposed by law upon him if his vision was temporarily
obscured; B. The defendant was going too fast for
existing circumstances and failed to have his car under
proper control; and C. The defendant failed to sound
his horn or swerve his vehicle from the course upon
which he was proceeding.

A.
THE DEFENDANT BREACHED THE DUTY
Il\IPOSED BY LAW UPON HIM IF HIS VISION
\VAS TEMPORARILY OBSCURED.
Defendant testified that although he saw the child7
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ren playing at or near the street and that he recognized
that children would do unpredictable things, he nevertheless assumed, because he saw the children retire
to the side of the road, that they would remain there
and that his way would accordingly be clear, notwithstanding the fact that his vision of the children and
that particular portion of the road where the children
were was temporarily obscured. It is submitted that as
a matter of law defendant's conduct was negligent and
reprehensible.
In the case of Holmgren vs. Fnion Pacific R. Co.,
114 Utah 262, 198 P. (2d) 459, the plaintiff was struck
and killed in a car accident when one of the defendant's
trains collided with the truck driven by the decedent.
The plaintiff contended that visibility along the tracks
wa~ obscured by telephone poles, steam pots, and other
landmarks and was further impaired by steam arising
from the steam pots and that as a result the decedent,
could not see the approaching train and could not have
been guilty of contributory negligence.
The trial court entered a nonsuit against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant and this court sustained that conclusion that the decedent n1ust have been
held to recognize that his vision would be ten1porarily
obscured and as a result the decedent had an obligation
to lH'Oel'l'd at such a speed as to pennit hiin to stop.
The Supre1ne Court sustained the judg1nent of nonholding in effect that one whose vision is te~upor
ari I.y oh~eurPd cannot assu1ne that his waY
. is clear but
that the driYl'l' n1ust adjust his speed in anticipation of
tlw fact that there may be danger ahead and so that once
~uit,

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

his vision is clear, he can stop. The court said at page
462:

"If, as contended by plaintiff, the steam pots
and other obstructions to vision so substantially
limited Holmgren's view of the tracks as to leave
it uncertain in his 1nind whether or not any trains
were approaching, then he should have proceeded
slowly and with caution to that point where he
could get an unobstructed view of the tracks, and
he should then and there have observed for approaching trains before attempting to cross the
tracks. The conclusion is irresistable that Holmgren either failed to look, or having looked, failed
to heed what he saw or should have seen. He
must, therefore, be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of fact. *

'* • • "

Certainly this motorist was in no better position
than the motorist in the Holmgren case, and certainly
the duty that he owed to himself and to the railroad
company can not be as great as the duty which l\Ir.
Nelson owed to this three and one-half year old plaintiff when he had knowledge that he was approaching a
situation which he recognized to be fraught with uncertainty.
This same view was set forth in Seybold v. Union
Pacific R. Co. 7 Utah 7 239 P. (2d) 174. There the plaintiff was struck by an unlighted caboose that was drifting toward the crossing. There plaintiff claimed his
vision was obscured by the engine lights of a train standing below the crossing. The trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant and
the Supreme Court upheld it, stating that the nwtorist
was guilty of negligence as a Inatter of law.
9
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This is not law peculiar to railroad crossings. It
affects motorists generally. Blashfield Vol. 1, Sec. 689.5
states at page 586:
"If a motorist cannot see clearly, he has no
right to assume that his course is free of danger
but must anticipate that some hazard to himself or others lies immediately beyond his range
of vision."
See also Langley v. Viguerie, La., 189 8. 606; Fabel
v. Hazlett, Pa., 43 .A. (2d) 373; Halley, et al v. Josey,
Ala., 82 S. (2d) 328.
The problem due to 1Ir. Nelson's lack of vision might
be likened to that of a driver whose vision is temporarily obscured by the lights of an approaching 1notorist.
In People v. Lett, 77 Cal., A. 917, 177 P. (2d) 47, the
plaintiff was charged with manslaughter. He was convicted and appealed contending that the lights of an
oncoming car blinded hun, that he kept on driving at
approxi1nately the sa1ne speed but he "let up on the
gas-the accelerator". (Exactly ~Ir. Xelson's position
hen>.) The conviction wa8 upheld by the court stating
at page 48:
"Since appellant adnlits that as he approached the crosswalk in which decedent was
walking his eyes were blinded by the lights of
another car, it beca1ne his duty to be vigilant and
to antieipate the presence of a pedestrian in the
erosswalk who could not be seen by reason of
the bright lights. His inabilit~- to see objects in
l'ront of hin1 enlarged his obligation to be cautious
at the street intersection. He had no right to
assun1e that the road was clear, and the fact that
he did not know that decedent was in the cross-

10
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walk is no excuse for his failure to give warning.
Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308, 317, 237 P.
1066; :Meyers v. Bradford, 54 Cal. App. 157, 159,
201 P. 471. His lack of knowledge of the presence
of decedent in the crosswalk did not justify his
not keeping a proper lookout for pedestrians.
Reaugh v. Cudahy Packing Co., 189 Cal. 335, 340,
208 P. 125; Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal.
32, 37, 179 P. 203, 15 A.L.R. 401; Schomer v. R.
L. Craig Co., 137 Cal. App. 620, 624, 31 P. 2d 396."
If the evidence was strong enough to support a
felony conviction, can it be successfully denied that Mr.
Nelson was not guilty of negligence as a matter of law
in a civil case or that there was not substantial evidence
to sustain the court's order. Indeed the instant case is
stronger because :M:r. Nelson himself knew of the presence of children when he was 200 feet distant from the
point of impact.
Finally the court said at page 49:

"It is sufficient to say that a reasonably
prudent man would not drive at a speed of 25
miles per hour into a place where pedestrians
are expected to be and have a right to be when
conditions are such that he is unable to see any
object in front of him."
Can we say

more~

In Murray v. Pear·san Appliance Store, N cu., 54
N. W. (2d) 250, the plaintiff was a minor who was in-

jured by a motorist who claimed his vision was temporarily obscured. The court said at page 255:
"In this respect we have said: 'On principle
it would appear that the existence or presence of
11
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smoke, snow, fog, mist, blinding headlights or
other similar 'elements which materially impair
or wholly destroy visibility are not to be deemed
intervening causes but rather as conditions which
impose upon the drivers of automibles the duty
to assure the safety of the public by the exercise
of a degree of care commensurate with such
surrounding circumstances. Anderson v. Byrd,
133 Neb. 483, 275 N.W. 825; Fischer v. :Megan,
138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287.' Fairman v. Cook,
142 Neb. 893, 8 N.W. 2d 315, 318.

" ' * * * where the vision of the driver of an
automobile is obscured, whether by the lights of
an approaching car, fog, smoke or for any other
reason, it is his duty to stop until visibility is
restored, or to reduce his speed and have his
car under such control that he can stop immediately if necessary. French v. Nelson, 111 Vt.
386, 391, 17 A. 2d 323; Powers v. Lackey, 109 YL
506, 507, 1 A. 2d 693; Paln1er v. ~Iarceille, 106
Vt. 500, 508, 175 A. S1; Steele v. Fuller, 104 Vt.
303, 311, 31:2, 158 A. 666.' Price v. State Highway Com1nission, 62 \Yyo., 385, 167 P. :2d 309,
313, quoting fr01n Taylor v. Quesnel, 113 Yt. 36,
29 A. 2d 812."
The court concluded that under these principles
the truck driver wa~ undoubtedly guilty of negligence.
In view of the age of the plaintiff and the conclusion
that he is incapable of contributory negligence, it would
~et>m that there can be no conclusion other than that
this child should recover as a n1atter of law.
See al8o: .Lllcsnickou· r. Fawcett. 99 Cal. A. 357, 278
P. 500; 1Jc11son r. A11dcrsou. 1:2n Trash. 19, :2:23 P. 1063;
hyclwll<'r u. Bjornstad, ct al., ~V. D. 40 X. Tr. ('!.d) 59;
12
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Coward'~'.

Buckert, Pa., 113 A. (2d) 287; Lang v. Rogney,
J.liinn., 201 F. (2d) 88; Earley v. Sutherby, Mich., 67
N. W. (2d) 174; Miller v. Hine, et al., N.Y., 120 N.Y. 8.
(2d) 231.
It is inescapable that the defendant's claimed defense is no defense but that on the contrary the defendant is impalled upon his own spear by his admitted
failure to take proper precautions after his vision was
blocked, if blocked it was.

B.
THE DEFENDANT WAS GOING TOO FAST
FOR EXISTING CIRCU1fSTANCES AND FAILED
TO HAVE HIS CAR UNDER PROPER CONTROL.
It has been established that 1Ir. Nelson did in fact
breach his duty upon having his vision temporarily
obstructed. The end result was that he was negligent
as a matter of law. The corollary to this is that he
was likewise negligent as a matter of law in being unable to stop his vehicle either because he was going too
fast or because of his lack of a proper effort to cnntrol
the car.

A motorist who is blinded by bright lights and who
continues to drive at the same or a slightly decelerated
speed has transformed his automobile into a death dealing juggernaut and if, while traveling in that elongated
dark zone, he runs down someone who is unable to
avoid him, he can't plead immunity from his responsibility. Coward v. R1tckert, supra.
Similarly under Wisconsin law a motorist has a

13
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duty to
that he
blinded
a speed
vision.

drive his automobile at such a rate of speed
can stop within the range of his vision and if
by lights of an oncoming car, to drive at such
as to enable him to stop within the range of his
Lang v. Rogney, supra.

See also: Krauth, et al. v. Billar, et al., 71 Ariz., 298,
226 P. (2d) 1012; Earley v. Sutherby, supra; King v.
Farmers· Educational and Cooperative Oil Co., S.D., 33
N.W. (2d) 333; Marsee v. Hunt's Adm'x., Ky., 55 S.Tr.
(2d) 376; Fynn, et al., v. Kumamoto, et al., 22 Cal., A.
607, 72 P. (2d) 248; Harrison v. Travelers Jiut. Casualty
Co., etal, 156 Kans., 492, 134 P. (2d) 681.
In Benson v. D. & R. G., 4 Ctah (2d) 38, 286 P. (2d)
790, the plaintiff was driving west toward a crossing at
a speed of 15-20 miles per hour. Plaintiff's witness saw
the train of the defendant from a point 6:2 feet away
from the locmnotive, although plaintiff said he couldn't
see the train more than 25-30 feet away. The court
held that in cases where the obstruction to vision ·was
caused by the defendant, a different problen1 might
arise, but in the absence of that, which was not the
occasion here, the general rule applied, and stated at
page 704:
··r:rhis court is comn1itted to the rule announeed in Dalley v. l\fid-\Yestern Dairy Products Co. as follows:
.. ·In this jurisdiction th2 doctrine is established 'that it is negligence as a InattcJ.· of h:w
for a person to drive an aut01nobile upon a
t ravded public highway. used by ,~rhicles nnd
pP<lPstrians, at such a rate of speed that said
autonwbile cannot be stopped within the distance
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at which the operator of said car is able to see
objects upon the highway in front of him.'
"By his own testimony plaintiff was traveling not less than 15 miles per hour and his visibility was not greater than 30 feet.
In the
ordinary reaction time of 3j4 second (the time
between recognition of danger and application
of brakes) plaintiff would travel 16¥2 feet before brakes were applied, and would have required at least an additional 13 feet to have
stopped on good dry pavement and not less than
18 feet on wet roads after brakes were applied.
Thus at the minimum speed estimated, it was
impossible for plaintiff to have stopped his automobile short of 34.5 feet and well above the
distance of visibility. That was negligent as a
matter of law."
The court held the plaintiff was negligent as a
matter of law, stating at page 794:
"Plaintiff's own testimony compels the
clusion that if he had looked he could have
the train in time to escape, and he must be
contributorily negligent as a Inatter of law
ring recovery."

conseen
held
bar-

And further at page 794:
"We believe that all reasonable men would
agree that if plaintiff had looked he could have
seen the approaching train in time to stop and
avoid the collision, unless he was traveling too
fast under the existing conditions to do so."
Let us look then as to what is said. The court held
that the view cited above is the rule in Utah and that
the motorist must have his car under such control as to
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employed this most obvious and usual safety
measure, he would have stopped 35 feet short
of striking the boy. Defendant also testified that
he was travelling about 25 miles per hour (tr. 77).
Assuming that speed, he would travel 27.5 feet
during the reaction time before the brakes were
applied; after application, the brakes would have
stopped the car in slightly less than 35 feet,
making a total stopping distance of 62.5 feet 1,
which would still leave his car 15.5 feet from
impact with the boy. It seems unquestionable
that at either the above speeds there was a fair,
clear margin of safety by which defendant could
have avoided the collision if he had applied his
brakes when he first realized the danger. Further,
if by any chance the brakes had not completely
stopped him, he would have slowed down sufficiently to have avoided the collision or at least
so that the death or serious injury to the deceased
would have been averted."
How can defendant deny his negligence on the facts
here at issue~

c.

THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SOUXD HIS
HORN OR SWERVE HIS VEHICLE FRO:JI THE
COURSE UPON WHICH HE \VAS PROCEEDING.
The only case in Utah on the subject is Jl orby c.
Rogers) supra. There the defendant blew his horn twice,
once when he was 200 feet away and again when he was
20 feet away. The court had already found the defendant negligent as a 1natter of law but did note as follows
at page 237:
"Sounding his horn: The defendant's own
testi1nony reveals that he was aware that the
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deceased seemed to be oblivious to his approach.
He did sound his horn at 200 feet but waited until
within about 20 feet of the boy before sounding
it again. Should we exclude the other safety
factors above mentioned it seems that the jury
could reasonably have found that a further warning by the horn between those two distances may
have enabled deceased to learn of defendant's
approach and avoid the collision."
Thus it is certain that Utah recognizes the duty of
a driver to use his horn under proper conditions. It
has not had occasion to rule upon the duty to swerve.
However, eighteen states have recognized this problem.
In every jurisdiction the courts have held that when the
driver knows of the presence of a child in or near the
street or highway, the circumstances may require the
driver to turn aside, 30 A.L.R. 2d 56.
The newest case on the subject is Sullivan, Admr.,
v. United States, ________Fed. Supp ________ , decided June 28,
1957, cited, 12 Automobile Cases (2d) 91. The decedent,
a three year old child, was killed by a truck of the defendant. The driver noticed the child playing near the
curb but he did not reduce speed, blow his horn, or
swerve. rrhe court held that the defendant was negligent
as a matter of law, stating:
"Defendant was negligent. A higher degree
of care than is ordinarily required is required of
a driver who has reasonable ground to believe that
a child may run into his path. In such a case it
is the driver's duty to exercise such a reasonable
degree of care as the circumstances require. The
employee should have realized that decedent
might step into the path of his truck.
"A reasonably prudent man, acting under the
19
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same circumstances, would have anticipated that
a small child might step from the curb where
she was playing onto the street. H·e would have
done everything possible to avoid striking the
Defendant's employee should have atchild.
tempted to bring his truck under control. He
should have slowed down, sounded his horn, or
anything possible to avoid the accident. The
failure of defendant's employee to meet this
standard was the proximate <:;ause of decedent's
death. Decedent, being 3 years old, is conclusively presumed to have been clear of contributory
negligence."
Can the defendant here, who acted identically to
the driver of the vehicle 'in the Sullivan case, be held
to be different
By the defendent's own testimony he
was n~gligent as a matter of law.

'

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ORDERING A NEW TRIAL
A review of the evidence demostrates conclusively
that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law
and the evidence. The facts and the law prove that to
pennit such a verdict to stand would be contrary to all
rules of fair play. Contrary to defendant's contention,
the court would have abused its discretion and ignored
its clear duty had it failed to act as it did. This duty
that rested upon the trial court was well stated in
King v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra, as follows at page

696:
"The law is well established that, on consideration of a Inotion for a new trial on the ground
of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
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verdict or decision, a trial court is not particularly
concerned with the fact (if it so appear) that
* * * the evidence (is) 'conflicting.' To the
contrary, notwithstanding any such conflict, or
even though the apparent weight of the evidence
should be in support of the 'verdict or decision,'
since it is the personal duty of the trial judge
to weigh and to consider the evidence and to reach
a just conclusion thereon, if he be satisfied that
the verdict or decision in question is not in fact
supported by the evidence, or that it is contrary
to the weight of the evidence, he is not only
authorized, but it is his bounden duty to grant
the motion for new trial. 20 Cal. Jur. 117, 118,
and authorities there cited. In such a situation,
on appeal from the order, all that is required to
sustain it is the fact that the record discloses
substantial ·evidence in support of the conclusion
that has been reached by the trial court in that
respect."
The rule was repeated in Marshall v. O.U.R. & D.
Co., Utah, 221 P. (2d) 868, and reaffirmed in Bowden
v. D. & R. G. Western R. Co., 3 Utah (2d) 444, 286 P.
(2d) 240, as follows at page 241:
"Ordinarily the trial court has a wide discretion in granting or denying motions for a new
trial, with which this court is reluctant to interfere, and will do so only if there is a clear abuse
of discretion."
The rule in the King case is still the rule in Utah.
The defendant contends that such is not so and puts
forth the Bowden case, supra, and Reynolds v. W. W.
Clyde Co., 5 Utah (2d) 151, 298 P. (2d) 530, as his
authority. An examination of these cases demonstrates
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that the cases do not support the defendant's contention.
The trial court granted a new trial in the Bowden case
because of a believed error in law. The Supreme Court
held that the trial court's instructions were in fact
correct and that no error had been made. As a consequence there was no reason for the trial court to have
granted the new trial.
Reynolds v. W. W. Cylde Co., supra, does not deal
with the question of new trial or abuse of discretion
In any way, shape or form.
As a consequence, the contention of the defendant
is without substance or authority.
CONCLUSION
The position of the trial court was amply supported
by the law and the evidence. It did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff a new trial. If there
be any error at all it was in not granting the plaintiff
a directed verdict against the defendant on the issue
of negligence.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
PATTERSON AND KUNZ,
.Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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